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Key Concepts for making informed Choices 
An alliance of researchers lays out a framework for taking decisions based on thinking critically about 
claims and comparisons.  
 
Everyone makes claims about what works. Politicians claim that stop and search will reduce violent crime; 
friends claim that vaccines cause autism; advertisers claim that natural food is healthy. One group of 
scientists claims that "deworming" programmes (giving deworming pills to all school children in affected 
areas) improve school performance and health, calling deworming one of the most potent anti-poverty 
interventions of our time. Another that deworming does not improve either school performance or health. 
Unfortunately, people often fail to think critically about the trustworthiness of claims, including policy 
makers weighing claims made by scientists. Schools do not do enough to prepare young people to think 
critically1. So many people struggle to assess the trustworthiness of evidence. As a consequence, they may 
not make informed choices.  
To address this deficit, we present here a general tool: Key Concepts for Making Informed Choices (Table 1, 
with examples in Box 2). We hope scientists and professionals in all fields will use, evolve and evaluate it. 
The tool was adapted, drawing on the expertise of two dozen researchers, from a framework developed for 
healthcare 2 (Box 1).  
Ideally, the Key Concepts for Making Informed Choices should be embedded in education for citizens of all 
ages. This should be done using learning resources and teaching strategies that have been evaluated and 
shown to be effective. 
Trustworthy evidence  
People are flooded with information. Simply giving them more is unlikely to be helpful unless its value is 
understood. A recent survey in the UK showed that only about a third of the public trust evidence from 
medical research; about two-thirds trust the experiences of friends and family 3.  
Not all evidence is created equal. Yet people often don’t appreciate which claims are more trustworthy than 
others; what sort of comparisons are needed to evaluate different proposals fairly; or what other information 
needs to be considered to inform good choices. 
For example, many people don’t grasp that things can be associated without one necessarily causing the 
other. The media sometimes perpetuates this problem by using language suggesting that cause-and-effect 
has been established when it has not 4, using statements such as “coffee can kill you”, or “drinking one glass 
of beer a day can make you live longer”. Worse, exaggerated causal claims often pepper university and 
journal press releases 5. 
Studies that make fair comparisons are vital, yet people often don’t know how to assess the validity of 
research. Systematic reviews that synthesise well-designed studies relevant to clearly-defined questions are 
more trustworthy than haphazard observations; they are less susceptible to biases (systematic distortions) 
and the play of chance (random errors). Yet results from single studies are often reported in isolation, as 
facts. Hence the familiar flip-flopping headlines such as “chocolate is good for you”, followed the next week 
by “chocolate is bad for you”.  
To make good choices, other types of information are needed too — for example about costs and feasibility. 
Judgements must also be made about the relevance of information from research (its applicability or 
transferability from one situation to another), and about the balance between the likely desirable and 
undesirable effects of a drug or therapy or regulation.  
When it comes to carbon taxes, for example, policymakers need to consider evidence about their 
environmental and economic effects, judge how applicable that evidence is, weigh how onerous the 
administrative difficulties are, model how tax burdens will be distributed across socioeconomic groups, and 
think about whether the taxes will be accepted in their jurisdictions.    
Critical thinking 
Individuals and organisations across many fields are working to enable people to make informed decisions. 
These efforts include synthesizing the best available evidence in systematic reviews; making that 
information more accessible, for example through plain language summaries or open access; and teaching 
people how to use such resources. Examples include the Cochrane Collaboration, the Campbell 
Collaboration, the Collaboration for Environmental Evidence, the International Society for evidence-Based 
Health Care, the Center for Evidence-Based Management, the Africa Centre for Evidence, the International 
Initiative for Impact Evaluation and the What Works Centres in the UK.  
Unfortunately, academics tend to work in silos, missing opportunities to learn from others. The expertise of 
the authors of this article spans 14 different fields: agriculture, economics, education, environmental 
management, international development, healthcare, informal learning, management, nutrition, planetary 
health, policing, social welfare, speech and language therapy, and veterinary medicine.  
We have identified many key concepts that apply across these fields (Table 1). Some additional concepts are 
more relevant in some fields than others. For example, it is often important to consider potential placebo 
effects when assessing claims about medical treatments and nutrition, but these are rarely relevant with 
respect to interventions in the environment. 
Our collaboration has already prompted many of us to develop frameworks for specific fields and to suggest 
improvements to the original Informed Health Choices framework 2. There is power in identifying an issue 
that resonates across different domains; it provides the momentum to align efforts. 
The Key Concepts for Informed Choices is not a checklist. It is a starting point. Although we have organised 
the Key Concepts in three groups (claims, comparisons and choices), it can be used to develop learning 
resources that include any combination of these, presented in any order. We hope it will prove useful to 
people helping others to think critically about what evidence to trust and what to do, including those 
teaching critical thinking and those responsible for communicating research findings.   
Next steps 
Evidence-informed practice is now taught to professionals in many different fields, and these efforts must 
grow. It is also vital that school children learn the Key Concepts, rather than delaying acquisition of these 
skills until adulthood. Children who have been explicitly taught critical thinking make better judgements 
than those who have not6. Early education sets an important foundation for teaching time-pressed adults. 
An important part of the work of encouraging critical thinking is learning and sharing strategies for 
promoting healthy scepticism while avoiding unintended adverse consequences. Possible unwanted 
consequences include inducing nihilism; allowing for disingenuous claims that uncertainty is a defensible 
argument against action (on climate change, for example); or encouraging false beliefs that competing 
interests among those promoting interventions renders all research untrustworthy.  
Competing interests take different forms in different fields, but the challenges and remedies are similar: 
recognition of competing interests, transparency, and independent evaluations. Achieving these depends on 
improved public understanding of the need for evaluation, and public demand for investment in independent 
evaluations, as well as unbiased communication of evaluation findings. 
Further development and specialization of the Key Concepts for Informed Choices is needed, and we 
welcome suggestions. For example, further consideration needs to be given to how these concepts can be 
applied to system-wide changes, such as mitigation of the effects of climate change or adaptation to 
environmental change, taking into account complex, dynamic interactions and feedback loops.  
To facilitate further development, we have created a website (www.thatsaclaim.org) where the Key 
Concepts can be adapted to different fields and target users, translated into other languages, and linked to 
learning resources. 
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Randomised trial 
Kids taught health tool in Uganda pass test 
The Informed Health Choices (IHC) Project was initially developed between 2012 and 
2017 by a collaboration including some of the co-authors of this article (Andy Oxman, 
Astrid Dahlgren, Iain Chalmers, and Matt Oxman). It includes its own set of Key 
Concepts2, learning resources, and a database of multiple-choice questions to assess how 
well users can apply the concepts.  
 
In 2016, a randomized trial involving 120 schools and over 10,000 school children in 
Uganda showed that this resource improved the ability of 10- to 12-year-old children to 
apply 12 of the Key Concepts 7. These concepts included, for example, recognising that 
personal experiences alone are an insufficient basis for claims about effects, and that small 
studies can be misleading. In this trial, 69% of school children who were taught the Key 
Concepts passed a multiple-choice test of their ability to think critically about health 
claims, compared to just 27% of the school children not taught the Key Concepts. 
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Box 2. Key Concepts in Action 
Claims 
Key Concept: Beliefs alone about how interventions work are not reliable predictors of the 
presence or size of effects of interventions. 
Most people would intuitively say that it is hard to influence parents’ engagement with 
their children’s education. The common-sense assumption is therefore that more intensive 
(and more costly) interventions would be more likely to be effective. However, studies of 
intensive interventions have often failed to show effects on pupils’ attainment, as measured 
with standard tests 8. Meanwhile, a recent evaluation of the effects of simply texting 
parents weekly with updates about their child’s schooling had positive effects on children’s 
attendance, homework submission, and mathematics attainment 9. These effects were 
small, but the cost was very low. This illustrates that—contrary to intuitive reasoning— 
inexpensive interventions can be helpful, and expensive ones can fail. 
Comparisons 
Key Concept: Comparison groups (or conditions) should be as similar as possible. 
“Scared Straight” programmes take young offenders on prison visits on the assumption that 
this experience and listening to inmates’ descriptions of life in prison will deter juvenile 
delinquency. Before-after comparisons have found that such prison visits were followed by 
large reductions in delinquent behaviour. But a lot can change within a group of youngsters 
over time, including becoming older and more mature. How can anyone know that the 
prison visits caused the reduction? Fairer comparisons of prison visits were done in which 
youths were randomly assigned either to visit prison or not, thus creating groups of youths 
who were more comparable. Comparisons between these two groups showed greater 
subsequent delinquent behaviour in the youngsters who had been exposed to prisons than 
in those who had not10, 11. The before-after comparisons, lacking similar comparison 
groups, were misleading. 
Choices 
Key Concept: When there are important uncertainties about the effects of interventions, 
those uncertainties should be reduced by (further) fair comparisons. 
Performance-based financing schemes—where funds are released only if a specific action 
is taken or performance target met—have become popular in the health sector. Billions of 
dollars have been invested in promoting these schemes in low- and middle-income 
countries, with the aim of achieving international development goals12. For example, health 
providers have been offered financial incentives to increase the percentage of births in 
institutions (instead of at home), with the intention of improving maternal and newborn 
health and survival. However, performance-based financing schemes can have unintended 
adverse effects, such as encouraging health care workers to falsify records, or to neglect 
non-incentivized activities. In Tanzania, this scheme prompted some health facilities to 
threaten new mothers with fines or denial of vaccinations for their children. Where there is 
so much uncertainty about both the beneficial and adverse effects of an intervention, 
further fair comparisons should be done before or while rolling out such schemes.  
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Table 1. Key Concepts for Informed Choices 
  
Claims  
Claims about effects should be supported 
by evidence from fair comparisons. Other 
claims are not necessarily wrong, but 
there is an insufficient basis for believing 
them.  
Comparisons  
Studies should make fair comparisons, 
designed to minimize the risk of 
systematic errors (biases) and random 
errors (the play of chance). 
Choices  
What to do depends on judgements about 
the problem, the relevance (applicability 
or transferability) of the evidence 
available, and the balance of expected 
benefits, harms and costs.  
Claims should not assume that 
interventions are safe, effective, or 
certain.  
• Interventions can cause harms as well 
as benefits.  
• Large, dramatic effects are rare.  
• We can rarely, if ever, be certain about 
the effects of interventions.  
Seemingly logical assumptions are not a 
sufficient basis for claims.  
• Beliefs alone about how interventions 
work are not reliable predictors of the 
presence or size of effects.  
• An outcome may be associated with an 
intervention but not caused by it.  
• More data is not necessarily better 
data.  
• The results of one study considered in 
isolation can be misleading.  
• Widely used interventions or those that 
have been used for decades are not 
necessarily beneficial or safe.  
• Interventions that are new or 
technologically impressive may not be 
better than available alternatives.  
• Increasing the amount of an 
intervention does not necessarily 
increase its benefits and may cause 
harm.  
Trust in a source alone is not a sufficient 
basis for believing a claim.  
• Competing interests may result in 
misleading claims.  
• Personal experiences or anecdotes 
alone are an unreliable basis for most 
claims.  
• Opinions of experts, authorities, 
celebrities, or other respected 
individuals are not alone a reliable 
basis for claims.  
• Peer review and publication by a 
journal do not guarantee that 
comparisons have been fair. 
 
Comparisons of interventions should be 
fair.  
• Comparison groups and conditions 
should be as similar as possible.  
• Indirect comparisons of interventions 
across different studies can be 
misleading.  
• The people, groups or conditions being 
compared should be treated similarly, 
apart from the interventions being 
studied. 
• Outcomes should be assessed in the 
same way in the groups or conditions 
being compared.  
• Outcomes should be assessed using 
methods that have been shown to be 
reliable.  
• It is important to assess outcomes in all 
(or nearly all) the people or subjects in 
a study.  
• When random allocation is used, 
people’s or subjects’ outcomes should 
be counted in the group to which they 
were allocated.  
Syntheses of studies should be reliable.  
• Reviews of studies comparing 
interventions should use systematic 
methods. 
• Failure to consider unpublished results 
of fair comparisons may bias estimates 
of effects. 
• Comparisons of interventions may be 
sensitive to underlying assumptions.  
Descriptions should clearly reflect the 
size of effects and the risk of being 
misled by the play of chance.  
• Verbal descriptions of the size of effects 
alone can be misleading.  
• Small studies may be misleading.  
• Confidence intervals should be 
reported for estimates of effects.  
• Deeming results to be “statistically 
significant” or “nonsignificant” can be 
misleading.  
• Lack of evidence of a difference is not 
the same as evidence of “no difference”.  
 
Problems, goals and options should be 
defined. 
• The problem should be diagnosed or 
described correctly. 
• The goals and options should be 
acceptable and feasible.  
Available evidence should be relevant. 
• Attention should focus on important, 
not surrogate, outcomes of 
interventions.  
• There should not be important 
differences between the people or 
subjects in studies  and those to whom 
the study results will be applied.  
• The interventions compared should be 
similar to those of interest. 
• The circumstances in which the 
interventions were compared should 
be similar to those of interest.  
 
Expected pros should outweigh cons.  
• Weigh the benefits and savings 
against the harms and costs of acting 
or not. 
• Consider how these are valued, their  
certainty, and how they are 
distributed.  
• Important uncertainties about the 
effects of interventions should be 
reduced by further fair comparisons. 
  
 
